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Utilizing both primary

an~

secondary literature, this

study attempts to illustrate that the origins of one of Latin
America's most significant wars,

the Paraguayan War (1864-70),

are understandable only when viewed within the context of the
hi~torical

/

development of the Rio de la Plata as a region.

Adopting the fram.ework provided by Robert N. Burr in his
pioneering

work on the South American con ti.n~ti.tal balance of

power system, By Reason or. Force:

of P?wer in South

Amer~ca,

Chile and the

I~lanci~A

1830-1905 (Berkely, 1965), thio

thesis examines one particular outgrowth of the historical
I

·1

process in the Rio de la Plata:

The development of a regional

•

2

balance of power system in the

area~

It also illustrates that

such systems of international power politics are not necessari-

ly promotive of

~tability

between nations:

and equanimity in the relations

that balance of power systems are not static

but constantly changing, and that such changes are conducive
to friction,

intrigue, and

~ar.

By tracing the evolution of a regional balance of power
/

system in the Rio de la Plata and how the n·ations of the area
interrelated to one another within the context of that system,
-we can hopefully overcome the shortcomings of a whole host of
simple explanations which advance the hypothesis that the
Paraguayan War was the result of the personal aberrations and
ambitions of a single man--Paraguayan dictator Francisco
/

Solano Lopez.

Rather,

the Paraguayan War was the product

of complex causes, themselves outgrowths of historical pro/

cesses in the Rio de la ¥lata.

These predisposing causes to

war, which included protracted boundary disputes,

nationalism,

and the oftentimes conflicting economic aspirations of the
/

nations of the Rio de la Plata, interacted with the functionings and ma~hinations of a regional balance of power system
'

to create an extremely tense international situation by the
middle of the nineteenth century.
The above seems a more meaningful framework from which
to view the origins of the Paraguayan War and the history of
/

international relations in the Rio de la Plata (and might

prove fruitful in studying the origins of other South American wars).

The nations of the area interrelated with one

J

3

another within the

co~text

of a Platine balance of power

system, each intent u.pon maintaining its· sovereignty and
advancing its national interests.

Within such systems of

power politics group members share the

c~nviction

that any

significant change in their relative power positions threatens their national interests, and they react to such changes
)

by striving to maintain or ~ecreate a favorable power struc-

ture.

When the conventional techniques of diplomacy fail to

ensure a favorable equilibrium, that is, when the dynamics
of change within the structure threaten its maintenance and
the national interests of group

membe~s,

those nations often

take recourse to war as an instrument for re-establishing
or creating a favorable power equilibrium.
The dynamics of change in the La Plata Basin, where
.

/

Francisco Solano Lopez had fashioned a "potential Prussia
in South America,-" challenged

th~

Platine equilibrium.

The

other nations in the regional balance of power system responded by waging war upon the Paraguayan dictator because,
in the phraseology of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance,
"the peace, safety, and well-being of their respective
nations is impossible while the present Government of Para-

,

guay ex:l.sts."
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Paraguayan War (1864-70)

1

"South America's most

costly and bloody war," 1 pittad the tiny landlocked nation
of Paraguay against the allied powers of Br~zil, Argentina,
and Uruguay.

The Paraguayan War, known also as· the War of

the Triple Alliance, resulted not only in territorial concessions being granted the victorious allies by the
Paraguayan nation, but more significantly, in the near
annihilation of the male population of that defeated country.

Of a population estimated at slightly over one-half million
inhabitanis at the outset of th~ war, only 220,000 survived
and, of these, only 28,000 were adult males.

For the allies·

the war, while not neariy as devastating as for Paraguay
(one estimate places their combined losses at 190,000 men),
represented a drain on manpower and resources that could have
been better appropriated elsewhere.

2

The history of international relations in South America
'

is marked by innumerable boundary disputes, border clashes,

and an occasional international war.

The resort to war as an

instrument of international politics is usually the last recourse after all other weapons in the arsenal of international
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2

diplomacy have failed.

But war is more than just a manifes-

tation of international relations.

~t

is a significant event

in the histories of those nations involved, and its effects
transcend mere diplomatic questions and immediate concerns,
influencing as it does the history of

their international

relations and domestic development for years afterwards.
And because war is a significant phenomenon, it is

e~tremely

important to examine and understand the origins of international wars in the South American context--not only because
such wars have profoundly affected the course· of the domestic
and international history of the nations of the area, but also
because of the fact that these wars were the product of
historical developments and the study of the ante-bellum
situation offers· insights into the totality of the historical
experience of the regiori.
The present paper is an attempt

~o

explain the origins

of one of Latin America's most significant wars, the Paraguayan War.

As such, i t forsakes dealing with the military

history, the events, or even the results of that war.

Nor is

/

it meant as a diplomatic history of the Rio de la Plata region
although, by necessity, i t deals heavily with that topic.
Rather,

this paper is intended as an examination of the causes

of the Paraguayan War within the context of the historical
/

evolution of the Rio de la Plata as a

region~

It is hoped

thereby to shed light not only on the origins of that war,
but also upon the process of historical development· in the
I

Rio de la Plata.

Particular

emphas~s

will be placed upon one

3

outgrowth of that process, the evolution ~f a regional balance
of power system in the La Plata Basin, .and how that system

helped produce an extremely tense international situation in
/

the Rio de la Plata; a situation characterized by intrigue,
suspicion, and animosity, and hence, conducive to, if not
promotive of, war.
The student of Latin American history who endeavors to
understand the origins of the Paraguayan War is encumbered by
the fact that much of the writing concerning that drama displays a serious bias against one of its principal actors,
.

/

Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano Lopez.

This bias has

led to a whole host of simple explanations regarding the
war's origins, most of them blaming it on the personal aberra/

tions and ambitions of Lopez.
Typical of this literature is the account of one highly
regarded specialist of inter-American affairs who, in discus/

sing the Paraguayan War, says that the "younger Lopez, vain,
m~ntally

unstable, and craving glory and

militar~

prestige,

harbored the ambition of becoming the Napoleon of South Ameri-

ca.

•G)
,, Another well-known Latin Americanist's

treatment of

the war refers to the "insane war brought on by .the dictator
of Paraguay's • •

4
• • ambition to build a Platine empire."

According to the latter author, the "unbalanced despot" or
"mad dictator" (as you choose) "craved imperial glory, nothing
less than the creation of a huge Platine state with Paraguay
as its core and himself as

em~eror." 5

/

-~-.--

................ .-.--.... ............... ...

4
/
Lopez

'

.
contemporaries were, if anything,
even less gen-

erous in their appraisals of the man.
.

One North American

/

diplomat, stationed in Asuncion during this period, called
~

Lopez "a traitor, an assassin, a perjurer, • • • • and a
common enemy of mankind," 6 who had deliberatel~ provoked the
war so that he "might make a figure as a military character." 7
Another contemporary, an Englishman who served as an engineer
/

/

in Lopez' army, considered Lopez "a monster without parallel, "8 and while admitting ?redisposin~ causes such as the
existence of unresolved boundary questions and Brazilian imperialism, states flatly that "The war was begun by L~pez"9
who was "imbibed by a notion of • • • • playing Napoleon in
South America."10
One authority on Paraguay, who later became cognizant
of the implications of the bias
is Harris Gaylord Warren.

a~ainst

/

Lopez in his own work,

In an early work Warren had called

tci"pez a "vile .. monster whom no special pleadin~ can excuse, nll
/

and claimed that "Lopez precipitated the war and upon him must
rest the blame for what happened."1 2

However, Warren later

retreated from this earlier ..p.osition and wrote what amounts
to a major revisionist interpretation of the

Pa~aguavan

War.

In the latter work the author contends that much of the
writing on the war has relied too heavily upon the materials
I

advanced by the publicists of the Triple Alliance and Lopez'
detractors:

Many students of Latin American history,
the present writer. have been too

includin~

.........

"

5
/

hasty in accepting the anti-Lopez
ima~e of the
.
.
I
war.
We need to pay more attention to·what Lopez
and his writers insisted were Para~uayan motives
in precipitatin~ South America's most terrible war.
/

The pro-Lopez image of the war was constructed
by the Marshal himself, a fact which may well make
it suspect--but no more so than the ima~e created
by the Marshal's enemies.
The central idea, the
major thesis, is that the War of the Triple Alliance
resulted from an attempt to destroy the political
eouilibrium in the Plata basin.
Brazil was the
/
principal enemy of Platine equilibrium, and Bartolome
Mitre committed a serious blunder in ~romotin~ civil
war in Uruguay and then joining with Brazil aga~nst
Paraguay.
Closely connected with this equilibrium
ar~ument is the thesis that ~ara~uav was f i~hting
a war for survival.
Porte~o's still dreamed of bringing the old viceregal area under their control and
Brazil's territorial appetite was insatiable.13
Warren advances what he labels the "equilibri.um-survival"
I

.thesis and maintains that Lopez

full~

believed that Uruguayan

independence was indispensible for equilibrium in the Plata
region and for Paraguay's own survival; and that this was the

~key to every Paraguayan policy."~4
The most satisfactory and best documented treatment of
the origins of the Paraguayan War is that of British historian
Pelham Horton Box.

In his introduction Box cautions that the

war has too often been interpreted in light of a
"pe~sonality

and aberrations."

sin~le

man's

This he attributes to the

fact that most of the literature written in the English lan~ua~e

concernin~

the

Para~uayan

War has relied too heavily

upon the testimony of Charles Ames Washburn,
I

Minister accredited to Asuncion.

the first

u. s.

Washburn's experience of

"diplomacy under difficulties" (a reference to the title of
WashhuTn's book), savs Box, probably inclined him to what may

.

--~-·~

6

be called a "demonic interpretation of -history."

Washburn's

book is dominated by successive "villains and heroes," the
/

favorite villain being Francisco Solano Lopez.

According to

Box, "like all purely personal interpretations of history,
this one will not bear the,test of a close examination."1 5
On the contrary, says Box, complex and impersonal forces
were at work in producing that conflict:
• • • the origins of the Paraguayan War • • • •
demonstrate the immense complexity of forces at .
work. What emerges most clearly is the fact that
the war germinated in the politica~ and economic
instability of the states of the Rio de la Plata
at this period • • • • The national organization
of Argentina was at this time iniomplete • • • •
The internal situation in Uruguay was even more
confused • • • 16
The present writer is in concurrence with Box in
rejecting the "personal interpretation" of the origins -of
the Paraguayan War.

I

Certainly Lopez' reactions to events

/

in the Rio de la Plata during la63 and 1864 were important.
perhaps even crucial; but those same events and the actions
they elicited from L~pez were thems~lves the product of complex forces and, above all, the.result of historical developmcnts in the La Plata

ba~~n.

Careful examination of the

causes of the Paraguayan War suggests that the conflict
occurred primarily because of the complex power politics
of the region.

Deep-seated animosities and international

as well as intranational rivalries were complicated by the

1·

I

existence of unresolved boundary questions, nationalism,
and economic motivations, all interacting and acting upori
one another to produce an extremely tense international

~~~-·

I

1

situation which eventually culminated in the outbreak of war

in 1864.
The framework utilized in the present study for analyzing the origins of the Paraguayan War is largely adopted
from Robert N. Burr.

Burr has made a major contribution to

the study of intra-continental South American relations by
his works on the South American balance of power.

Disappoint-

ed with the standard accounts of the relations between South
American nations, which treat those affairs as a series of·
unrelated or discrete episodes, Burr set out to correct this
misassumption by providing a general framework within which
to view incra-continental South American relations.

He

argues that the "phenomena of relations between and among
nations are not discrete but continuous," and that "if we
know how and where to look for connections, we will find
them."

He goes on to assert his conviction that the nations
Ame~ica

l

of South

i

"depraved or enlightened le.aders, or to conditions that have

!

been created out of a vacuum and subsequently swallowed up

l

I

have not interrelated merely in response to

I

by it," but rather in response to "broad trends in both their

I

internal development and the totality of their international

I

relatfons. 1117
Burr suggests thttt "the main developments in the international life of South America may be fruitfully regarded as
phases in the evolution of a continental South American
system of power politics."

I
1·

18

Within such a framework, says

.-·---·
8

Burr, the ·apparently scattered events of South American
intra-relations have a meaningful place and relevance to
one another; that is, they assume a pattern in which "the
history of intra-South American relations • • • be co.mes
the comprehensible continuum that we believe it

to be."19

Burr defines a system of power politics as "a complex
of several sovereign stat.es, each· intent upon maintaining
its independence and upon competing with the others in order
to advance national interests."

According to him an unsys-

tematized group becomes systematized when the following
conditions prevail:
(1) group members share the conviction that any
significant change in their relative power positions may threaten the interest$ of individual
members, so that each· nation simultaneously
insists upon the need for maintenance of power
equilibrium and strives for a power structure
favorable to itself at the expense of others;
(2) group members compete with other group members
in the effort to incre~~e their power and advance
their national interests;
(3) the leadership of group members accepts the
basic axioms of power politics and is·willing to
use its techniques, including the various forms of
uni- and multilateral coercion.and the 'divide et
impera' principle;
·
~
(4) the international political interests of member
states are primarily, but· not necessarily exclusively,
centered upon intra-system relations;
(5) group members possess .the capability of shaping
the system's power structure without significant or
decisive out-group influence.20
Burr contends that such conditions were current in
America during the nineteenth century and that two

.._ ......

~

..__,

South
regi~nal

............. . - ............

9
balance of power systems existed in tbat area prior to the
1870 1 s when they became·integrated in a continental system.21
The nations most intimately· involved in these regional
balance of power systems were Chile and Peru on the west
coast of South America and Argentina and Brazil on the east.
The relative political stability of these nations, their
greater resources and wealth, and their

mili~ary

and naval

strength made them, says Burr, the great powers of South
America, rivals for influence over lesser nations and for
-control of strategic routes and sparsely inhabited territcries.22
In the La Plata basin, this rivalry centered on control
of that estuary and its confluents as well as hegemony over
the two lesser powers within the regional balance of power
system, Paraguay and Uruguay.

How this rivalry

·Co~tributed

to the outbreak of the Paraguayan War is most conveniently
expla:f.ned by ·examining its antecedents within the context
I

~

I
j
i

of the historical development of the region of the Rio de la
Plata.

I

I

l
l

I
I

l

·,·
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CHAPTER II

tHE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL
RIVALRY IN LA PLATA
-

/

The origins of international conflict in the Rio de
la Plata, and indirectly, the origins of the Paraguayan
War, stem from the Treaty of· ·rordesillas consummated, ironically, between Castile and Portugal in June 1494 ,. for the
purpose.of averting war.

By the terms of the treaty, a line

of demarcation separating the empires of the two contracting
parties was established 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde
Islands.

Although its exact location remain2d uncertain for

generations, owing to the lack of adequate maps and the
inability in those. days to measure longitude accurately, the
~

Treaty of Tordesillas established

Portugue~e

presence in the

Western Hemisphere on a legal basis and engendered more than
four centuries of litigation and conflict.l

i

1

Both the Spanish and the Portuguese claimed the estuary

I
l

of the Rio de la Plata.

I

open collision, as the Spaniards in the 16th century were

I
I

/

~hief ly

For years, however, there was no

interested in the Andean mining regions on the Pacific

side of the continent, and the Portuguese chiefly in the sugar
colonies of Baia and Pernambuco in the north.

Not until 1680

was a settlement made on the eastern bank of the estuary, when
the Portuguese built the fort of Col8nia do Sacramento

11

directly opposite Buenos Aires.

Co18nia soon became a

source of contention and whenever the· two crowns were at
war with one another, Spaniards from Buenos Aires crossed

over and expelled the Portuguese, and by the terms of the
peace in Europe, were as regularly compelled to retire.
The cause of this contention, and

the intricate diplomatic

maneuverings it spawned, was the fact that Col8nia was not
a colony in the usual

sens~

but rather an entrepot for con-

traband through which the subjects of other

k~ngdoms,

particularly the British, tapped the markets and resources
of Spain's New World Empire.2

The mercantile system of

Imperial Spain excluded foreigners from direct participation
in the trade of its colonies and so the British, through
their commercial treaty of 1654 with the Braganza's, utilized the Portuguese colony of Sacramento as a center for
contraband:

I

I

!
I
I

I
I
I!

By treaty right an important range of British
manufactures • • • • entered Portugal and Portuguese
possessions overseas • • • • The Brazil trade was
the means by which Britain secured a substantial
proportion of the bullion required for trade in the
Far East, and was the avenue! by which British manufactures found their way to Buenos Aires, Paraguay,
and Peru.3
Though· there is much controversy as to the

ex~ent

of the

contraband trade, most authorities admit that it was great
and some go so far as to speculate that, despite Spanish
prohibitions·against it, more silver bullion flowed eastward
from Alto Peru to the River Plate than along the

official

channels westward through Callao.4
Whatever the extent of this prohibited trade, it was

12
sufficient to cause alarm in ·spain and to draw from the Crown
spirited efforts to halt the encroachments upon its terri-

tory.

As already mentioned, numerous expeditions set forth

from Buenos Aires to expel the Portuguese from Co18nia do
Sacramento, and occasionally the town was destroyed.

In

·1729 a Spanish settlement was formally eatablished at

Montevideo.

In 1750 Spain

an~

Portugal signed .the Traaty

of Madrid which· gave to Brazil approximately the southern
and western boundaries she possesses today.

However, when

Spain entered the "Seven Year's War" in 1761, the treaty was
annulled.5

At the Peace of Paris Ci763), ColSnia do Sacra-

mento was restored to Portugal at the insistence of the
British, whose dependency by that time Portugal had become:

!
I

I
I
I

Portugal required British support at home and
abroad.
She was encouraged and-enabled to expand
the territory of Brazil. At the Peace of-Paris,
ColSnia do Sacramento was restored to Portugal.
She was assisted to defend herself against Spain
at home • • • • and the channels which Portugal
provided for trade with the Spanish Empire remained
intact.6
Spain's ignominious military defeat in the "Seven Year's
War," and the subsequent diplomatic.defeat at the peace table
in Paris, evoked from her a renewed determination to protect
the Spanish commercial

syst~~

and the Empire itself.

This

took the form of .a defensive overhaul of the Spanish Empire,
commonly known as the "Bourbon Reforms."

While the measur.es

themselves included economic, administrative, as well as
military reforms, the essence of the reform program was the

13
strengthening of Spain

an~

her·

withstand the assaults of her

E~pire

so as to be able to

aggress~ve

competitor nations.

As one historian has noted, the preoccupation of Charles III
was with "the security of Spanish America.

The survival of

Spain as a colonial power and therefore as a power to be
reckoned with in Eu~ope was the basis of his.policy."7

He

goes on to add that "the creation of more efficient agencies
was only a means to an end:

To increase the revenues of the

crown and to strengthen the defenses
session~.

the ov~rseas pos-

This demanded in the first place a break with the

antiquated commercial system." 8
program~

{9£

Wi~hin this broad-ranging

"Everything was subordinated to the growth of naval

and .military strength.

But this growth was dependent on an

increase of royal revenues." 9
The facet of the reform program of Charles III which
most concerns us, and which was to have far-reaching signi1

ficance for the later independent states of the Rio de la

!

I
I
I

I
l

I

Plata, was the creation of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la
Plata in 1776 (which included the present day republics of
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguaj, and Bolivia).

Buenos Aires had

always been the "soft underbelly" of the Spanish Empire in
South America, a potential gap in Spain's economic defenses
through which smugglers could undermine her trade monopoly
and drain off the wealth of Potosi.

As the 18th century

progressed, it was not only this economic factor which caused
Spain to act, but also her recognition of the strategic

14
importance of Buenos Aires to the overall strength of the
Empire:

"In this period Buenos Aires acquired a strategic

significance of the first· order, in that it was the best

base in the South Atlantic, the most effective guard over
the route to the Magellan Straits and to the Pacific, and
the best point of penetration into the interior of South
America." 10
The immediate circumstance which precipitated the
birth of the new viceroyalty was the renewal of Portuguese
aggressions in 1775 which induced Charles III to take steps
to settle the issue once and for

all~

In 1776 he sent a
.

/

10,000 man military and naval expedition to the Rio de la
Plata, under the command of Pe.dro de Cevallos, who also
I

bore the title of Viceroy of Rio de la Plata:

"The dis-

patch of Pedro. de Cevallos ·as Viceroy in 17 7 6 was a provisional step, inspired by the military needs of the moment.

i
I

The

permanenc~

of the Viceroyalty ·was assured by the appoint-

I
I

ment of his successor in 1778."ll

I

was received that the

I

Cevallos was proceeding

rapidly with the reconquest of the disputed area when word
quar~el

had been settled in Europe.

I

Cevallos had driven the Portuguese out of the "Eastern

I

Shore," and Spain made good its claim to the territory, as
recognized in the Treaty of San Ildefonso (1777) which
virtually

175o.12

~enewed

the terms of the repudiated agreement of

The region of the Banda Oriental was not again to

become a source of dispute for

n~arly

forty years • . However,

15
the struggle for control o~ the ~anda Oriental was far from
1~

over; it was only delayed. and when

resumed it had taken

on a different character as the former administrative units

of the Viceroyalty had achieved their independence from .
Spain in the ·years after 1810.

Moreover. the results of

the colonal conflict between Spain and Portugal were to
/

condition the ·nature of international rivalry in the Rio
de la Plata for generations to come.
One result of the rivalry between Spain and Portugal
in the Banda Oriental was the creation of the Viceroyalty
/

of the Rio de la Plata.

As one historian has noted, "Charles

. III, who for reasons really unconnected with the internal
problems of administration, wanted a bastion in the South
Atlantic· against the British and Portuguese • •

!·
I

• • found

.the projected viceroyalty the best form it could take."13
/

He goes on to add that the "Emergenc~ of the Rio de la Plata

as a prime factor in Spanish Colonial

I

l
I
I

!

pol~cy

was due less to

a realization of its economic possibilities than to its
strategic importance. 11 14

Indeed, the economic potential of

Buenos Aires and its hinterland were not to be realized
until the second half of the 19th century when

~mprovements

in technology and the demand generated by the expansion cf
industrialization in Europe combined to make profitable the
~xport

of bulk products typical of

tempera~e

zone areas.

Nonetheless, because of the strategic importance of Buenos
Aires, the Viceroyalty had to be maintained and this in

16
turn depended on its economic viability--its.ability to
attract settlers and support a

I
I,

defe~se

establishment.

·means by which the Spanish Crown provided for this

One

n~cessity

was by attaching the mining region of Alto Peru to the Vicer~yalty.

Another measure, of greater significance to the
/

origins of international rivalry in the Rio de la Plata during
the post-Independence period, was the opening of the port of
Buenos Aires to trade.

Both measures, particularly the

latter, had the effect of redirecting the trade·of the region
through the port of Buenos Aires, a process which had a farreaching impact on the economies of.surrounding regions.

The

decision made by Charles III, in consideration of the overall
strategic imperatives of the Empire, had the consequence of
sacrificing "the modest industries of the interior
cheaper · imports through Buenos Aires." 15

•

0

•

• to

It als·o gave rise

to an entrenched group of merchants at Buenos Aires with a
v~sted

intarest in subordinating the economy of the interior

I
I

regions to their own needs.

I

the national period of Argentine-history and were a prime

I
I

source of the regional conf lict--which was in
wa~

Both problems carri.ed over into

I

economic conflict--that

I

much of. its independent existence.
sans and tradesmen of

ot~er

esse~ce

.to plague that nation

16

~n

throughou~

Not only did the arti-

regions chafe at their economic

subordination to Buenos Aires, but also at their political
subordination to that viceregal power center.

Thus was cs-

tablished a pattern of localism and regional conflict that

.

,

....
1l
was to plague Argentina throughout most of the 19th century,
to contribute greatly to its inability to achieve political
stability, and to have an indirect, but nonetheless great,
effect on international relations within the La Plata Basin,
/

Secondly, the creation of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la
Plata brought into being serious problems of territorial
delineation that

were to frustrate the relations of the

soon-to-be independent nations of the region.

In essence,

the elevation of the former Audiencia of Buenos Aires to
the status of Viceroyalty simply superimposed a new administrative.unit on top of previously existing. ones, and laid
the basis for a

~entury

and a half of litigation that was

o~ten resolved only by the resort to war. 17
A third product of the Spanish-Portuguese riv3lry was.
the engendering of hatreds ~nd suspicions between the Spa~ish

.
I

and Portuguese colonists.

I

It was inevitable that such a

long-standing dispute, which often

~nvolved

military actions

i
I
i

undertaken by the colonials themselves (as.in the case of

I

produce animosity between the.colonists of Spain and Portu-

I
I

gal.

I

j

the French and British colonists in North America), would

In fact, the rivalry, and the hatreds and suspicions·

it spawned, carried over largely intact to frustrate the

j

relations of the newly independent nations of the region.

I

As one historian has pointed out with regard to Uruguayan-

I
I

Brazilian

~elations·

prior to the Paraguayan War:

The two nations were the inheritors of the
historic hatreds of the Spaniards aqd Portuguese

18
--dead rivairies that had become traditions and
found their indefinite perpe.tuation ·1n the
realities of the economic struggles of the
moment.
The international vende.tta was reflected
in a long series of outrages that form the main
theme of the diplomatic correspondence of Brazil
and Uruguay for years.18
He might have added that the same was true
lations with all of the Spanish American

of

Brazil's re-

Re~ublics

with

whom she shared common frontiers.
A fourth

result, closely related to the last point,

was the phenomenon of Brazilian imperialism.

~s

one his-

torian has suggested, "The concept of an expanding frontier

was inherent in the Braziiian historical tradition."19

I

It

might be posited that such traditions are themselves a
pr~duct

of history; that is, .that the experience of expan-

sionism in Portuguese Ametica was so imbedded that it was a
part of the heritage of independent Brazil.

has been advanced
Spanish America.20

Such an argunient

with regard to the political heritage of·
Whatever the case, independent Brazil

exhibited strong strains of a South American variant of

I

"Manifest Destiny", an expansionism that was to complicate

I

South American international relations for more than a

I

I
I

I
I
!
!

century:
The Braganza dream of rounding out t.heir' Brazilian frontiers and establishing control over both of
the continent's two main river systems • • • was made
easier by the failure of the Spanish to delineate
the boundaries prior to the wars of independence
and led to a century of litigation and resulted in
the Spanish American Republics losing much of their
• • • national patrimony.21
Moreover, Brazilian imperialism and territorial aggrandize-

.I

19
ment created suspicion and distrust of that nation among all
I.

of its neighbors.

Such sentiments are, needless to say, a

breeding ground for international conflict, since suspicion
of another's motives influences the way in which one interprets his actions and approaches relations with him.

Further-

more, Brazilian imperialism was, to some degree, indirectly
responsible for wars in South America in which that party
was not formally involved--in the case of the Chaco War,
both Bolivia and Paraguay had lost

t~rritory

to Brazil and

were unwilling to further relinquish what they considered
their national patrimony.

In the case of the Paraguayan War,

Brazilian imperialism manifested itself directly in her
protracted boundary dispute with the Republic of Paraguay and
in.Brazil's constant intermeddling· in, and sometimes control

over. the Banda Oriental of Uruguay •.
Thus it would seem that the conflict between Spain and
Portugal in South America established the preconditions for,
and in many ways, the parameters of, international rivalry
/

in the Rio de la Plata once the region had become emancipated from the mother countries of Spain and Portugal.

The

nature of that rivalry and its influence upon international
/

relations in the Rio de la Plata contributed directly to the
Paraguayan War and is the subject of the following sections.
Argentine independence from Spain was formally pro/

claimed by the Congress of Tucuman in 1816, but "de facto"

20
.

I

autonomy for most of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata

II -

had been effectively established six years earlier by the
famous "Revolution of May."

The ambition of the creole

intellectual and commercial elites of Buenos Aires, who had
initiated and led that movement, was

0

to perpetuate the

/

Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata as a unit under their
control."22

In fact, what oqcurred was a process of frag-

mentization of the former territories of the viceroyalty
which threatened, momentarily, to be the harbinger to the
Balkanization of southern South America.
Before that Balkanization occurred, however, the
porte~o elites undertook several measures

hegemony of Buenos Aires in the region.

to assert the
They sought to

secure the allegiance· of the Banda Oriental by dispatching
a force to dislodge the r o ya 1 officers at Montevideo •

I

sent a column of troops northward

i

that area for Buenos Aires.

I

I
I

I

I

I
l

I

to~ard

Th e·y

/

Asuncion to win

Another force took the inland

route of Cordoba, Tucuman, and

~alta

armies sent from the Viceroyalty-

to confront royalist

of Peru.

These measures were only partially -successful as the
porte~o ambitions to assert.· their authority over the former

territ-0ries of the viceroyalty· soon met resistance from the
outlying areas of that former administrative unit.

Because

of their isolation, the difficulties of transportation, and
the consequent limitations on inter-regional intercourse,
the towns in this portion of the Spanish Empire

·,

h~d,

by

21
necessity, developed considerable self-reliance and ind~pendeuce.

As a result, each town and surrounding rural district

was essentially an autonomous unit, with its own local interests and

leadership~-

While

th~se

local leaders accepted

allegiance to the remote and frequently ineffectual Spanish
Crown, they were less inclined to transfer that allegiance
to .the ups tart creoles of Buenos Aires. 23
~

/

At Montevideo and Asuncion porteno hopes were completely frustrated.

Shortly after winning independence from

Spain, the left bank of
control.

th~

estuary passed under Brazilian

A renewed campaign of liberatioµ, launched from
~

Buenos Aires in 1825, involved the portenos in a war with
Brazil.

In 1828, under British pressure, Uruguay was estab-

lished as a buffer state between Argentina and Brazil.
the north, Paraguay proclaimed its

inde~endence

To

of both

porte6o and Spanish control in .1811, and for half a ~entury
I

i
l

I

/

'

successfully isolated herself from the turmoil of Rio de la
Plata politics.

I

The desire for local autonomy ,was as strong in the

1·

I

I
I
I

I
I
i
I

inland towns of latter-day 'Argentina as it was in Paraguay
and Uruguay.

For the moment, however, the royalist armies.

from Upper Peru presented· a far greater threat to local
autonomy than did porteno ambitions, and the common struggle
against Spain imposed a degree of unity on the· scattered
towns:
The outline • • • • of Argentina thus took
shape during a decade of struggle for independence from Spain. Eastward the areas surrounding

.._

"!.

~~
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I

Asuncion and Montevideo went· their separate
ways, while prolonged Spanish occupation of
Alto Peru p.rovided the basis of a· separate
Bolivia. The threat of Spanish reconquest,
however, forced the remaining towns of the
Viceroyalty to co-operate for their common
defense. The first faltering step toward
nationhood had been taken.24
This was a short-lived unity, however, and began to break
down once the Spanish threat disappeared.

Before the pro-

cess of national organization was completed, Argentina was
forced to endure a half-century of regional conflict and
civil turmoil.
The basis of that conflict, the details of which do
not concern us, was the insistence by provincial elites on
cons~stently

the principle of local autonomy; they

resisted

·all attempts by the portenos to implement a centralist
regime controlled and

domin~ted

by·

th~

city of.

B~enos

Aires.

In essenc~, the problem revolved around the question of
national organization--what form it would take and how it
~lsd·

would be achieved--but it
tones.

While the provincial

opposed to the

t

I·
I

had important economic under-

l~aders

were not irreconcilably

of a national government, they were

for~ation

resistant to the imposition of ·a centralist government that
would dictate policy without an appreciation for the needs
and desires of the provinces:
The conflict between those who advocated a
strong central government and those who desired
to safeguard local autonomy was not an academic
problem to be resolved solely by persuasion and
by reference to recognized authorities.
On the

_7.... ~...~~ .. ~,; ,.

J

._....
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contrary, the problem was immensely practical;
it was rooted in the economic pattern ~f the
country, and its solution deeply affected the
economic interests of all classes of society
and every province of the Confederation.25
!·

The character of Argentina at this time was such as to
create a fundamental conflict of

e~onomic

interests between

the Province of Buenos Aires, more particularly the major
city of that Province, and the remaining provinces of the
embryonic nation.26

The portenos desired to maintain their

hegemony over the former Viceroyalty, especially the economic control their city· had exercised over the trade of the
region since the creation of

th~

Viceroyalty in 1776.

The

interests of the provinces--whose economies were comparatively more rudimentary, .self-sufficient, and therefore less
depende~t

on international trade than the economy· of Buenos

Aires--caused them to resist that control as well as the
.porte~o's
~£feet,

importunings of "free trade," both of which, in

woul~

destroy incipient local industries and sub-

jugate their local

economi~s

to the needs of Buenos Aires:

"Buenos Aires was an int e g·r a 1 part of the Rep u b 1 i c , but its
economic interests did not., always coincide with those of the
nation" and it "seldom hesftated to utilize its economic

suprem~cy to further its o~n interests."27
Given this

collisio~

of interests, provincial leaders

opposed the efforts by portenos to fashion a centralized
regime; they clung to local autonomy and with it, the
tariffs, import restrictions,

t~ansit

duties, and taxes,

which were the only means open to them of protecting their

24
interests until a form of national organization could be
~greed

~pon

that would allow them a

voi~e

in determining

their destinies.28

thus the Argentine Republic became embroiled in a
controversy between Federalists (preponderantly prov~ncials)
and centralists (portenos) that was to forestall its national organization and to contribute to the political instability that characterized its first fifty years of national
existence:

"Thus the economic issue became a political

issue in which state's rights were pitted against centralization.

Around this issue.centered the political and

social struggles of the first four decades."29
this political instability helped

~roduce

In turn,

the international

complications that form part of the background of the
Paraguayan War.

1.

I
I

I
j

I

l

I
l

CHAPTER lII
PARAGUAY AND THE PLATINE BALANCE OF POWER

,
Spain and Portugal's historic rivalry in the Rio de la
Plata carried over largely intact to frustrate the relations
of the newly independent nations in the region.

The most

significant conflict, that between Brazil and Argentina for
control over the Banda Oriental del Uruguay, was complicated
by the dissolution of the former Vi~eroyalty

following its

independence from Spain (into the present-day Republics of
Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, and Bolivia).

As will be seen,

Brazil utilized the divisions among the former segments of
/

the Viceroyalty to advance her
Brazil had many motives
ment in Platine affairs.

·p~licy

in the Rio de la Plata.

impell~ng·her

towards involve-

The desire to control the rich

cattle-producing region of the Banda O!iental was but part

!

of a grand design by the-Empire to dominate the La Plata

I

Basin and its tributaries.

r

I
I

?hit-river network served as the

life-line in Brazil's communications with her landlocked and

isolated interior provinces--if direct control

over those

waterways should prove unattainable, then Brazil would defend

at all costs her rights to their free and open use.l
A second element·of the grand design was Brazil's determination to prevent the reconstruction

of the Viceroyalty of

·~

26

,

the Rio de la Plata as an integrated political unit.
element involved two considerations.
"realpolitik":

This·

The first was simpl1

Brazil did not want to see the emergence of

a strong republic on its southern flank.

Second, and closely

I

related, was the fact that such a power could impose its will
with regard to th• use of the· river system, a possibility to
which Brazil could not remain indifferent.
Thus Brazil meddled in the affairs of all the Platine
republics, exploited the divisions which had emerged following independence, and, above all, attempted to prevent the
rise of a strong ·.nation capable of doing her harm.

In other

words, B;azil endeavored to maintain a balance of power in
the region favorable to herself.·
measure of plain old-fashioned

To this was added a liberal

imp~rialism.

The Empire's

involvement with Paraguay is illustrative of the workings of
/

Brazilian policy in the Rio de la
Lon~

i.
I

and bitter tariff

~ars

Pl~ta.

during the colonial period

had created among Paraguayans an instinctive hatred for the
portenos of Buenos Aires who, prior to independence, had

I

I

controlled the trade of the La Piata .Basin. 2

I

royalty of the Rio de

I

I
I

/

When the Vice-

la Plata achieved its independence from

Spain, Paraguay went its own way.

Buenos Aires, unwilling to

let go so easily, followed up an invitation for the Paraguayans to join in the military struggle against Spain by dispatching a military expedition to·subdue the fledgling republic and
return it to the orbit of Buenos Aires.

The porteno army, led

27
/

by Manuel Belgrano, was defeated at the Battle of Tacuari

(1811) and thereafter Paraguay maintained its independence.
But Buenos Aires was not content to ·let the matter rest; and,
as will be $een, one of the major themes of Argentine diplomacy has

been the re-establishment of the hegemony of Buenos

Aires over the territories of the former Viceroyalty.
/

/

.

Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia, first in

a long sue-

cession of Paraguayan dictators, dreamed of developing Parag~ay's

overseas trade, "but the covert hostility of Buenos

Aires, against whose opposition he was never able to vindicate
his claim that Paraguayan produce should be permitted to pass
free of all intermediate duties and tolls, defeated his
efforts."3

Unable to establish his claim to freedom of navi/

.

gation of the Rio de la Plata and its tributaries,

d~sturbed

by the anarchic conditions· convulsing the other states of
/

Rio de la Plata, and aware of the
against the

!~dependence

conspira~ies

the

being·plotted

of Paraguay from outside. its borders,

during the. 1820' s Francia shifted· his
involvement in Platine affairs.

pol·~cy

t~

one of non-

In later years, defending his

policy, Francia asserted that.he
•.•• recognized· the advantage the country would
obtain by the exportation of such products.as are
surp~us, but not ye.t [has] the germ of anarchy in
the neighboring states been extinguished; on the
contrary, it [:r.s] every day gathering greater
energy through the purely personal struggles of
the factions seeking power and continuing one and
all to conspire against the independence of Paraguay
which must be preserved at all costs • • • 4 ·
Francia's policy of non-interc6u~se with the other nations of

28

,

By the time of his

the Rio de la Plata proved a.wise course.

death in 1840, Paraguay had achieved a degree of stability
and growth that compared quite favorably with that of her
neighbors who had become involved in both internal and external political

fratricide.
/

Carlos Antonio Lopez, Francia's .successor, attempted to
change Paraguay's by-then traditional policy of isolation and
to open up his country to
nations.

trad~

and intercourse with other

L~pez' decision proved fateful for his.small nation

as Paraguay soon became embroiled in bitter and protracted
conflicts with her neighbors.
/

One of Lopez' first acts as President was

to request

recoinition of Paraguaya~ independence from the Argentine
Confederation, a request which Argentine dictator Juan Manuel
Rosas refused to grant.

F~llowing

a second refusal from Rosas
/

to recognize his nation's independence, iopez resorted to
desperate measures.

As one historian explains

it,

0

lle was

genuinely alarmed at the unexpected attitude of Rosas which

l

he consirued as·another threat to Paraguayan independence

I.

from the hated portenos."5

I
I
I

a treaty of commerce and navigation with

I

O~

/

December 2, 1844, Lopez signed
Joaqui~

Madriaga,

Governor of the Argentine Province o.f Corrientes, whose
province had for some time been· in revolt against Rosas.
/

.

Rosas was enraged at Lopez' action and the following
month he issued a decree denying passage of vessels to or

29

fr.om the ports of the Confederation

~nd

Paraguay.

The

Argentine dictator completed the embargo on April 16, 1845,
prohibiting the introduction of Paraguayan goods into the
Confederation by either land or water.

I

Lopez reacted to

Rosas' embargo, which effectively strangled the commerce of
his nation, by concluding an,offensive and defensive alliance
with Corrientes against the Argentine Confederation in November of that year.
It was at this point in the deterioration of ArgentineParaguayan relations that the designs of the Brazilian Empire
--which the previous year had

·attempted unsuccessfully to

form an alliance with the Paraguayans against Rosas--6 were
to make themselves felt.

As Box describes it:

·In the course of the negotiations L6pez, on the
covert suggestion of the Brazilian Minister,
Pimenta Bueno, propos~d as
condition of the
alliance that Entre Rios and Corrientes should
declare themselves independent of ·the Argentine
Confederation and constitute themselves as an.
independent state. Here quite clearly L6pez was
acting as the tool of Brazil. The plan for a
further segregation·of the ·former viceroyalty
was an old favorite with the Brazilian Chancellery
haunted by a prophetic. vision of a great Argentina.7

a

i

I

I

I
1·

The. Brazilian Minister's proposal was part of a larger scheme
by the Empire to undermine Rosas and to keep the Argentine
Confederation from reasserting its hegemony over the former
Viceroyalty.

.

/

In this effort Lopez was a pawn, an instrument

I

to be used in achieving the overall purposes of Brazilian

I

policy:

"What Brazil wanted wa,s to compromise Paraguay with
/

Rosas, and that Lopez proceeded rapidly and effectively to

,1 -
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do."8

As the British Minister at Rio de Janeiro described
I

it, Brazilian policy in the Rio de la Plata was a classic

example of divide et impera:

The policy of Brazil in the River Plate has
hitherto served her own objects: by holding
out hopes to all parties in turn she has for
a long time maintained an influence over all
without binding herself completely to any.
'Divide et impera' is her morito, and it has
certainly placed all these republicans at her
feet.9
On December 4, 1845, Lo'pez;declared.war on Rosas and
the following month a 5,000 man Paraguayan force commanded by
the President's son, Colonel Francisco Solano Lopez, invaded
Corrientes.

However, before the; Paraguayan army could get

into action, the rebellion was crushed by Federalist troops
I

'

under General Justo Jose Urquiza, and the Paraguayan army was
forced

to retire from Argentine territory.
Rosas was prevented from following up his victory over

Corrientes with an· invasion of iaraguay because of international complications with France and En$land.

So he contented

himself "with making Carlos Antonio- L~pez' flesh creep f~om
time to time" with statements
independence.lo

tnrea~ening

to Paraguayan

Such was his message to the Congress of the

Argentine Confederation in late 1847 in which he observed
that "The Gbvernmcnt of the Province of Paraguay still cherishes the senseless design of separating itself from the
Confederation.••ll

Three years later he secured the· following

decree from his obedient legislature:

31
The most Excellent Governor and Captain General
of the Province, Don Juan ·Manuel de Rosas, is
authorized to dispose without any restriction
of all the funds, revenue and resources • • •
of the Province until the reincorporation of
the Province of Paraguay in the Argentine Confederation has been effected,12
It is difficult to determine Rosas' intent. in making
these

sta~ements.

He never seriously attempted an invasion

of the "Province of Paraguay," and a safe bet is that while
be never entirely accepted its

independence, he was prevented

from subduing the tiny Paraguayan nation.because of the inter~al

rebellions he constantly faced within the Argentine

Confederation itself.

Perhaps he hoped that someday his nation

would achieve the internal unity that wo.uld be requisite for
such an adventure as reincorporating the former segments of
the old Viceroyalty.
this is

conje~ture,

Illuminating in this respect, and again
was the position maintained by Rosas in

his diplomatic dealings vith other

nati~ns.

In February of

1845 he prote~ted Brazil's r~cognition of Paraguayan indepen•

dence g·ranted in September of the pre·vious year.

Three· years

I

later, on learning that the Austrian Empire had granted

I

recognition to Paraguay, Rosas had his Foreign Minister,

!

Felipe Arana, address a long· ·note ·of

I

Vienna in

pro.te~t

to ·the Court of

which he maintained that Paraguay was merely a

rebellious province of the Confederation and asserted that the
Argentine Confederation had nalways preserved its rights over
the territory of Paraguay and regards it as one of the Argentine provinces. 11 13
Whatever the case, Rosas continued to:make statements

:·

..... ...
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/

threatening the continued sovereignty of Paraguay, and Lopez

.

construed those threats, rightfully or not, as a potential
menace to the independence and well-being of his nation.

The

Arg~ntine

dictator also

tight~ned

his blockade of the

/

Parana River, thus frustrating Lopez' efforts to increase
the commerce and prbsperity.of his tiny landlocked nation.
As one historian speculates, Rosas was utilizing his control
.
over the river system "as a·means of attracting, or forcing,
Paraguay to join the Argentine family."14
Given this state of relations between Paraguay and the
Argentine Confederation, it is not

s~rprising

that Carlos

.

/

Antonio Lopez found himself drifting into alliance-with the
enemies of Rosas.

In 1851 Pa~aguay alligned herself with

Brazil, Uruguay, and the

Arg~ntine

suc~eeded

lition which ultimately

enemies of Rosas; a coain destroying Rosas' army

at the Battle of Caseros in February of 1852.
/

.

With Rosas ousted and Lopez' (ormer allies in power at
Buenos Aires, the independence o~ Paraguay was recognized ~y
the Argentine

Confederation~on

July 17, 1852.

Matters looked

auspicious for the future welfare and prosperity of the

tiny

Paraguayan nation, but the situation soon soured as Paraguay
became embroiled in· boundary. :disputes with both her large
neighbors.

The source of those disputes is well illustrated

in the lengthy quotation

i. ,. +

1~

which follows:

~

~

•

,..,.....,"" '
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Imperial Spain bequeathed to the emancipated
Spanish-American nations not only her own frontier disputes with Por~uguese Brazil, but problems which had not disturbed her, relating to
the exact boundaries of he~ own viceroyalties,
captaincies general, audiencias, and provinces.
The frontier regions were generally wild and
populated, if at all, by savage Indian tribes~
Only the continual sapping and mining of
Portugal's subtle policy of expansion into just
~uch undefined regions:roused Spain to the
need for exact surveys.
Possible overlappings
of authority among her own loosely defined
administrative divisions could not be important, since there was no discussion about
jurisdictions in the populated districts.
Just such queations, however, are elevated
into matters of 'life and death!' 'vital interest,' 'national hono~,' by the insatiable
appetites and monstrous superstitions of the
modern nation-state; and such questions have,
in fact,
been the nightmare of international
relations in Latin America since th~ emancipa•
tinn of that continent from Spain and Portugal. 1 ~
The preceding quote well summarizes the situation with which
Paraguay found herself faced upon attaining her independence
.from Spain.

She had inherited from that colonial power

territorial disputes with both her large neighbors, and
numerous attempts at settle~ent .. of these disputes had all
ended in failure.16·

I

and suspicion

\.

ism~

I
I
I
I

Those failures in turn had bred ill-will

among the contending parties, and the antagon-

thus fostered were partially responsible for the hig~ly

charged atmosphere of Platine international relations.
an environment was
it

conduciv~

Such

to war· and, as experience proved,

was through war that the territorial _questions achieved

~heir

final resolution.
Paraguay's territorial dispute with the Argentine Con-

federation concerned ownership of the Miaiones region and

.. ,.

..J:

~~·

f.,,µi, ....:.

,.

...~.
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the boundary between the two nations in the Chaco.

Two days

prior to the signing of the treaty-whereby Argentina recognized the independence of Paraguay, a treaty of navigation
and boundaries had been negotiated between the two governments.

In return for definite ownership of the disputed
/

Chaco territories, Lopez had been willing to concede ownership of the Misiones region

t~

Argentina.

Apparently, the

Paraguayan dictator.had a premonition of his future problems
with Brazil, for he had been willing to grant title to the
more valuabla and strategically important Misiones--which
/.

would give his landlocked nation access to the Rio de la
.

/

Plata th.rough the Rio Uruguay-7for the relatively worthless
Chaco and Argentine support in his boundary dispute with
Brazil.

The ultimate rejection of that treaty by the Con-

gress of the Confederation, due to its clauses relating to
/

the frontier in the Chaco, could only have increased Lopez'
already great suspicions of Argentine intentions.17
/

.

That Lopez' suspicions of Argentine designs were
essentially well-founded

is

also illustrated by the fact

.

that a certain segment of Argentine opinion, and a fairly

high-placed segment at that, had never given up the hope of
re-incorporating Paraguay within an administrative unit
encompassing the former Viceroyalty.

On April 24, 1865,

more than half a century after Paraguay had established
her sovereignty, the British Minister at Buenos Aires,
Edward Thorton, reported to his Government a conversation

r:

~. ~

....... _.,

,.n. ~ ... ~

e-r. •
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with Argentine Foreign Minister Rufino de Elizalde in which

.the latter express:.ed himself as hoping that he "should live
to see Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the Argentine Repub-

lie united in one Confederation, and forming a powerful
Republic in South America."~8
~

Lopez was aware of

th~s

.

sentiment in the Argentine

Contederation and it influ~~ced:the conduct of his diplomacy with that nation.

That diplomacy was characertized

by suspicion and covert hostility on
towards Argentina.

/

the ·part of Lopez

But Argentine-Paraguayan relations

never attained the degree

of antipathy that marked the

latter nation's relations with its other large neighbor,
Nor did the boundary dispute with Argentina ever

Brazil.

attain the acrimony, nor the violence,

of Paraguay's terr!-

torial dispute with the Imperial Government.
/

Following Caseros, Lopez attempted to reach agreement
on his outstanding problems.with the Empire of Brazil.

In

1852 the Paraguayan dictator.conferred
powers on his Consul
..
.
at

Ri~

de Janeiro to

s~ek

renewal of the alliance with

.

Brazil and settlement · of the territorial question •

I

overtures

I
I

I

w~re

rebuffed:

The objec'tives of the Empire ·1n constructing
the alliance of 1850 and forcing the recogni~
tion of Paraguayan independe~ce upon her a~lies
was two-fold.
First, to prevent at all costs
her nightmare of a reconstructed viceroyalty
of Buenos Aires, then to achieve the freedom of
the River Plate.
Both objectives were won at
Caseros • • · • • Brazilian influence was in the

....-'-"t :'

~ ~ .......

'.t

/

Lopez'
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.

I

ascendant / in the lands -of the Rio de la Plata
• • • • Lopez was no longer a serious factor
in the calculations of Brazilian diplomats.19
../
The Brazilians no- longer needed to court Lopez and once

again they claimed the

/

:

Rio.~pa

as the boundary between the

Paraguay cl~imed~·~ightfully,20 that the boun-

two nations.

dary lay farther north at the

Ri~

/

Branco, and Lopez was

resolved not to accept Brazilian.pretensions.

As Box caus-

tically comments:

•

Brazil has had a boundary discussion with every
state in South America except Chile • • • ; Since
she has conducted so many ~crimonious controversies
with her neighbors, Brazil. has developed a very
high and recondite technique in these matters.
One seeks in vain for any guiding principle in
Brazilian dipl~macy • • • ·• At the risk.of cynicism one··may say that perhaps there is a principle
at work in these interminable discussions--by any
means and by the application of any 'principle'
or sophistry to win more territory.21
For Brazil the territorial question was bound up .with

~

her long-range goal

I

terior provinces.

of develojtng the economies of her inShe was anxious to establish a definitive

boundary for her interior.Prov~nce of Mato Gros~o, but was
I

i

even more determined to guarantee her transit rights along

I

the Rio Paraguay as

r

overland communications with that province:

I
I

/

it was almost impossible to maintain

the matter was the m~intenance of river communications with
Mato Grosso" which without the
/

use of the Rio Paraguay
1·

"The crux of

~was

ad~antage

~irtually

of free and open

amputated from the

/

trunk of the nation."22

Lopez-utilized the question of

transit rights as a guid

pro~

for gaining· a favorable

settlement on the boundary question.23

But Brazil was un-
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willing to compromise on the frontier issue as a means of
achieving its larger objectives, and from 1852 forward,
relations between the two nations became increasingly acrfmonious, setting the stage for Paraguay being drawn into
the Uruguayan vortex:

By refusing to accept.the Apa as a northern
boundary • • • • Paraguay had· incurred Brazil's
enmity~
~wice, in 1850 .an~ again in 1855, Carlos
Antonio Lopez had ejected Brazilian garrisons
from territory claimed by Paraguay, and war was
narrowly averted in the latter year.
Brazil had
forced Paraguay to grant free navigation of its
rivers in 1858.
These matters alone would have
been enough to cause war.
Add· to them Paraguay's
loss of the missions south of the Parana .to
Argentina and Brazil, and the Ur~guayan imbrogiio,
and one wonders why war had not come sooner.24
Thus has one historian summarized relations
and Paraguay during the 1850's· and 1860's.

betw~en

Brazil

The details do

not concern us, and it suffices.to say that the long-standing boundary dispute was largely responsible for the in~reasingly

bitter relations· of .the two nations, and this

antagonism came to bear upon their

~elations

with the other
.

/

states of the Rio de la Plata after Caseros (1852).

I

i

I
j

I
I

I

'3.;•."- ·;·

CHAPTER IV
URUGUAY:

POWDER KEG OF LA PLATA

If, ~uring the decade endtng with the Battle of
Caseros (1852), Paraguay had come to be used as a tool in
the Brazilian intrigues against the restoration of a strong
Argentina, Uruguay had always been used as such.

The contest

between Brazil and Argentina for control of the Banda Oriental had its roots in the colonial rivalry between Spain and·
Portugal for control over.the eastern bank of the La Plata
Basin.

For the Brazilian Empire, coritrol

ove~

the· Banda

Oriental was both a means of preventing the restoration of
Air~s·'·

Buenos

hegemony over the former viceroyalty, and part

of a constant effort to

i

B~sin

I

ior provinces.

establi~h

and thereby safeguard

control of the La Plata

communicat~ons

with her inter-

i

The Empire desired to break the bonds of her colonial

I

economy, and one of the means of achieving this was through

1·

the development of the rich resources of her interior pro-

r

vinces.

I
l

capable of producing stapl~ food for the Empire~ for at that

I
I

She also hungered to augment ber control of lands

time she was an importer of such products as grains and beef.

In all these plans, the Banda Oriental was a key:

If non-tropical Brazil was to have a center
dominating the web of rivers serving as her

·, -

39
nervous system, that center was Montevideo,
would enable the Empire t~ control the
Rio Uruguay, and dominate the Rio de la Plata
and the mouth of its other great tributary,
the Parana.
In order to cease to be a colonial
country, in order to possess a capital that
would exploit her tropical Empire as a true
metropolis, Brazil had to seek.--a political
center on the estuary of the Rio de la- Plata. 1

w~ich

These Brazilian aspirations naturally collided with the
Argentine desire to reconstitute its hegemony over the
former viceroyalty.

This conflict of interests kept

Platine affairs stirred up for several decades, and contributed directly to the advent of the Paraguayan War.
Portugal took

advantage of the instability follow-

ing the independence of the former Spanish colonies to pursue its desire to

cont~ol

the

B~nda

Oriental.

In 1816 the

Portuguese marched into the Banda Oriental·on the pretext
of

assisting in the restoration·· of the. authority of

Ferdinand VII.
during the

e~rly

When Brazil became an independent state
1820's, the Banda Oriental was incorpor-

ated in the Empire as the Cisplatine Province.

The

"·

-Government at Buenos Aires

l

prot~sted

this action, refusing

l

to receive a Brazilian envoy unless he renounced the
1.
~ires

l

Brazilian claims to the territory.

I

dispatched an agent to Rio de Janeiro to see what might be

I

accomplished through negotiations.

I

and there matters rested until April 19, 1825, when a band

In 1823 Buenos

The result was

no~hing;

of refugees from the Banda Oriental, the "Immortal-Thirty
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Three", led by General Juan Lavalleja 1 ~rossed the river
from Buenos Aires and

launche~

a revolution against the

·Imperial Government at Montevideo.2

Events soon conspired to draw Argentina into the fray,
and by the end of the year Argentina
Follo•ing initial successes by the

~nd

Brazil were at war.

revolutiona~ies

and their

Argentine allies, the military campaign soon bogged down.

A prolonged stalemate ensued and England, whose commercial
interests were adversely affected by the feud, .forced a
settlement upon the

bellige~ents.

The creation of the Republic of Uruguay in 1828 as
a buffer state

bet~eeri

Brazil and Argentina was a solution

imposed upon the belligerents from the outside and proved
acceptable to neither· of them.

_ AlthGugh both nations were

bound by the treaty of 1828 to

~espect

and guarantee the

sovereignty of the new nation, they continued to interfere
in the affairs of that country ·for the next forty years.

I

The attitude of the Brazilian Foreign Office with regard

I
I
I·

to that

I

1.
1

l
I

I
I

solution is

illus~rated

in the instructions of

the Marquiz of S-anto Amaro·, sent to Europe by the Empire
on a diplomatic mission in 1830:

In regard to the.new Uruguayan St~te, it is
not a part of Argentine territory, has once
been incorporated in Brazil, and cannot exist
independently of another state. Your excellency
will en~eavor opportunely and with frankness
to prove the necessity of incorporating it within
the Empire.
It is the sole vulnerable flank of
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Brazil and • • • • the natural ~oundary of
the Empire and finally, the effective means
of removing
and preventing fur~her cause
of discord between Brazil and the states of
the south • • • 3

The Argentine attitude closely paralleled that of Brazil.
Juan Manuel· Rosas, Argentine dictator from 1829 to 1852,
never entirely accepted the establishment of Uruguay as an
independent

natio~,

that Republic,

an~

continued to

in the

~eddle

of

~ffairs

made numerous attempts to draw it back

into the orbit of Buenos Aires.
General Fructuoso Rivera, one of Lavallej a '·s lieu tenants in the revolution against Brazil,

be~ame

the first

President of Uruguay under the Constitution of 1830.

During

the debates over the Constitution, Rivera and Lavalleja had
a falling-out; the latter twice revolted against the
President, was beaten on both occasions, and compelled to
take refuge in Brazil.4
Rivera·· was peacefully succeeded in 1834 by General
Manuel Oribe, another hero of the War of Independence.

Oribe

proceeded to antagonize Rivera ·by allowing ~he exiled
Lavalleja

~o

·return to Uruguay.

Rivera rose against Oribe
I

I

I.

I·
I
I

and was decisively routed at the Battle of Carpinteria (1836)
by a force that included, interestingly enough,
by Argentine dictator Juari Manuel Rosas.

troops sent

At the Battle of

~

Carpinteria, Oribe's men carried white pennants, Rivera's
red~.and

thus appeared the

nam~~

of the two parties that
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were to divide the allegiances of Uruguayans from 1836
forvard.5
In 1838 Rivera again revolted, this time successfully,

and Oribe fled to Buenos Aires
eral Rosas.

and the

protectio~

of Gen-

Rivera was re-elected President, and.on March

10. 1839, declared war on the Argentine dictatoT for the
help he had afforded Oribe.

With aid and encouragement

from Rivera, a force of anti-Rosista exiles assembled in
Montevideo and launched an invasion of Argentina.

Also

assisting in this attempt-to topple Rosas was France, who

was

then quarrelling.with-the Argentine dictator over

commercial privileges and the. treatment received by .its
nationals in his country.
Thus· began the famous "Guerra Grande", the main highlights of

lilhich were

the Frenc·h blockade of Buenos Aires

from 1838 to 1840, the joint Anglo-French blockade of the
same port (1845-48), Rosas' pTo_longed siege· of Montevideo
(1843-51), and, ultimately, Rosas'· downfall in ·1852.

significant

A

by-product of:the-"Guerra Grande" was the

entanglement of

Argentine~Uruguayan

politics it engendered.

As one historian notes: · ·
Here we see the origins of the extraordinary
confusion of party relationships in Argentina
and Uruguay.
Oribe by calling in Rosas had
brought a veritable Trojan horse into Uruguay.
The struggle between the Federals and Uni~arians
in Argentina was transferred to Montevideo-the Blancos of Oribe and the Federals of Rosas
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outside the walls of · the devoted city, the
Colorados of Rivera and the Argentine Unitarians • • • • within.
National boundaries were
transcended in the titanic party strife of
these great spirits.6
Thus was established a pattern which was to complicate
Platine affairs for several decades and to contribute to
the international tensions responsible for the Paraguayan

War.
An indirect by-product of the "·Guerra Grande" was the
/

overthrow of Rosas by General Justo Jose Urquiza at the
Battle of Caseres in February of 1852.

Rosas' siege of
/

Montevideo interrupted international commerce in the Rio
de la Plata and

the British and French responded by insti-

tuting a blockade of the ports of the Argentine Confederation which lasted from 1845 to 1848.

As one student of

Argentine history describes it::
The inequity of the economic system instituted and defended by Buenos Aires became
especially oppressive during the blockade;
for the incidence of trade disruption was
uniformly severe in the -provinces • • • 7
/

Urquiza, Governor of the Argentine Province of Entre Rios,
-

-

had. like many other Federalist caudillos. cooperated with

j·

I
!
I
I

I
I

Rosas for many years in his battles

~gainst

But Urquiza now began to 4uestion whether
cooperation_ was not too great.
for decades and its economy

~as

the Unitarians.
the price of that

The nation had been at war
in shambles.

There was a

generalized longing for peace and prosperity abroad in the
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nation, but Rosas persisted in the-course of war.

The men

who had supported Rosas began to doubt· that "an unstable .
currency,

a depletion of scarce supplies of labor, and an

atmosphere of insecurity unfavorable to investment were
justified in the interest of incorporating Paraguay in the
Argentine Confederation arid of installing a Preside~t
Montevideo agreeable to R~sas.~~

in

Urquiza was also aware

of the fundamental conflict of economic interests between
Buenos Aires and the other Argentine Provinces, a conflict
which had become more clear-cut during the long reign of
Rosas:
Not the least motive leading Rosas' greatest
lieutenant to declare. against his chief was·
the economic rivalry of Buenos Aires and the
rest of the Argentine provinces. Rosas to
con•olidate his power had persistently pampered
the great city which held a monopoly ·of the·
international tr~de of the whole Confederation.
a sense ~he war was· the struggle of Entre
Rios followed by other ·provin_ces . • • • • for
the economic emancipation. of the Confederation
from the yoke of Buenos Aires, which should be
followed by a national reorganization that would
put the portelos an~ their~city in their places.9

1,

Rosas'
of the

policies~-his

former appendages

w~th riverine ~ommerce,

refusal to accept the independence

o~·

and

the viceroyalty,

his interference

his extended siege.of Montevideo-/

had made him many enemies in the Rio de la Plata, both
and without the Argent!-ne Confederation.

~ithin

When General

Urquiza pronounced against Rosas on May 1, 1851, he was joined
not only by other provincial caudillos and the anti~Rosista

Unitarians, but·

Ur~guay,

Paraguay, and Brazil lent .their aid

in the movement which led to

t:~~

Rosas' downfall in February 1852.

·-~--

i'·

.,,
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The fall of Rosas did not bring peace to the Rio de la
Plata.

Partisan conflicts soon re-emerged in both Argentina

and Paraguay; and once again they became entangled

in the

complex milieu of Platanese international relations.
Allied with Urquiza in his victory over Rosas had
been the Argentine Unitarians.

As Box points

out, this

was a mariage de convenance, ~or the Unitarians and Federalists shared fundamental political, ideological, and

cultural differences.lo

In part, this was a typical case

of urban-rural conflict, a sort of Main Street versus Wall
Street; but it was

~ls6

something more than that.

The

Unitarians had by this time come under-the influence of
their second generation, the famous "Generation of 1837,"
and,· significantly, had changed their party label to that
of Liberal.

This group

wa~

animated by and were protagon-

ists of the liberal doctrines then current in Europe.

Their

movement, allowing for differences in the Latin American
socio-economic structure,

I
I

I
I
I
;

L

I.
~

I.

~as

part_ of the nearly universal

challenge by bourgeois groups or the remnants of the ancien
rlgime.

As such,. the values t~ey expounded, their disdain

for traditional values and traditional society,
belief in the superiority.of urban

and their

civilization, all con-

f licted with the value system and mores then existing in

the rest of Argentina.

For. the Unitarians, Urquiza was the

I

symbol of that provincial particularism and traditionalism

1·

which stood in the wa. y of their. p 1 ans to rem-a ke Argenti n'a •

..

M,

<.·!I
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They wanted to destroy

th~t

traditional society and build

upon its ruins a modern Argentina in the image of the Liberal·
postulates then current--and, it should be added, under their
benevolent guidance.
Shortly after Rosas' overthrpw, the Unitarians rebelled
against

Ur~ui~a

from the

and succeeded in driving the Federalist forces

city in. September·

1852~

Following a brief and

~11-

fated attempt to subdue the rebellious province, Urquiza
decided to let Buenos Aires go its own way and for the· time
being to concentrate on

es~a~lishing

Argentina in the interior.

the Confederation of

·But _neither

group accepted this

as a final solution to the problem of who. would
Arge~tina

and along what.lines·it·would be organized; nor

could they.
to

exp~oit

c~ntrol

Buenos Aires was the

n_at~ral

e~trepot

from which

the wealth of the nation and neither could survive

indefinitely.without the other.

The titla of James

Scobie'~

highly regarded work, Argentina: - A City and A Nation, neatly
capsulizes the essence of the conflict which has plagued
Argentina throughout its history:

i.

I

.the preponderant influence

which one city has exercised over the affairs of an entire
nation.
This is what led Urquiza to ris~ against Rosas, and he

I

remained determined that porteno aspirations to control the

I.

destiny·of the nation should.never be realized.

\

I

I

.

~

~stablishing

.

He set about

the Ar~entine Confederation on a sound basis.

He created a port at Rosario, encouraged the immigration of

Co
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··foreigners and their capital, and made public investments
designed to foster·the economic deyelopment of the interior
and littoral provinces.

at Rosario, as well as

In an effort to encourage commerce
to~augment
.
.

the revenues at his dis-

{.

posal for developmental investments, Urquiza initiated a
deferential tariff that favored,products shipped directly
to ~osario.

This led t~ t~ade wars with the porteios which

further heightened the antagonism between the two groups.
Compounding an already tense situation
was the unsettled state of affairs in Uruguay.

in Argentina
There, a

b~ief rapprochemenf following Cas~ros had broken down, and
the Blancos and.Colorados were once again at each others'
throats.

As

a result of that civil war, in which ·the

Brazilian. "army of occupat·ion held the scales of power, nll
.the Blancos

had ascended to power in Montevideo.

tably, Buenos

~ires

became

·th~

!nevi-

asylum of the.extreme

Colorados, and "the cours~ of ~~vents led fatally to the
cooperation of the exiled·Colorados

with their old allies

the Liberals of Buenos Aires, ·opposed by the more or less

i

close alliance of the Blancos with Urquiza and the Argentine

I

Fe.derals."12

I

deo and Buenos Aires by exiles in both capitals against

I
I

their enemies.

Continued raids were organized from Montevi-

exp~ditions,

These

winked at by authorities

in both cities, led to a further estrangement ·of relations.

I

The raids were notoriously ·unsuccessful in achieving their

I

purposes, usually resulting in ~he defeat, captur~, and
brutal execution of the_ invading forces.

}"

·~~

'"1- .. 'i""

..~

,.

These atrocities

.. ·
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further inf lamed partisan

pass~ons

and drove the contending

parties to.greater extremes:
• • • Blancas and Colorados were in the habit
of transferring their immense· hatreds to the
larger stage of the distracted Argentine
Confederation, and of contributing at each
crisis between Buenos Aires ~~d the Confederation their individual quota of venom to
the embittered ·struggle bf ~ederalists and
Unitarians. After a battle between the
Argentine parties their ·Uruguayan allies
~ould seek each other out f~r. purposes of
massacre and outrage.
The interaction of
four furious parties
involving two states
directly in their faction fights • • • ~
is as difficult or even impossible to·
de·s cribe as t.he similar problem of three
or .more forces in dynamics.13
The internationalization of conflicts between the parties of
these two nations culminated

a

~nitarian

1861.

in

t~e

Federalist's defeat by

army under General Bartolome

Mit~e

at Pavon in

Urquiza announced his retirement from politics and
Pr~sidenc,

Mitre ascended to the

6f Argentina in 1862.

Having

finally resolved the factional issue of who was to ~irect that
nation's destiny, the Argentines s•tiled down to deal with
the problems of political integration and economic development.

Matters looked auspi~iou~ ~or the Arg~ntine Republic

after.nearly five decades of internal political strife and,
indeed, probably would have.been had not the Uruguayan situation flared up once again ,-to
I

~omplicate

the international

.

relations of the Rio de la·Plata.
Among those present with Mitre and his victorious
Unitarian Army at Pavon had been .his close friend,

"'

·~

,.

the
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Uruguayan Colorado, VenRncio Flores.

On April 16, 1863,

.Flores launched an invasion of his homeland from Buenos
Aires to unseat his
Montevideo.

Blanc~ enem~es

then in control at

The Flore's reyoluiion in Uruguay was, above

all, the immediate cause of ,the situation which culminated
in th~ outbreak of the Par~gua~•n War.

t.

describe$ Uruguay as the ".p~wde
.
'

Cha~les Kolinski

keg. of La Plata" and states

that Flore's departure from. Buenos Aires during April of

1863 was "the match."14

As Kolinski describes the situation,

"During the remainder of 1863 and the first six months .of
1864, the Uruguayan situation grew all out of proportion,inexorably drawing

A~gentina

-a~d

Brazil, as well as Paraguay,

into its vortex. 11 15
Flores began prepari~g his revolution against the
Blanco regime soon .after th.e Battle of Pavon.
·her of

.1862.Dr~

Octa~io

During Novem-

Lapido-was sent by the Blanco Govern-

ment on a special mission to Buenos Aires t~ bring to the
attention of the Governme~i of .~rgentina that Flores was
organizing a revolution aga{nsi the Constitutional Government
of Uruguay from within their boundaries.

1·

President Mitre

requested unequivocal proo~. tha~ Flores and his companions

I

I

were conspiring against th~~Uruguayan Governme~t, but when

I

I

I
I

that proof. was later presented, no action was taken ·against
the conspirators by the Argentine Government.
~atisfaction

with regard to his·

p~otests,

Not receiving

other than pro-

fessions by the Argentine Government of !ts neutrality,

Lapido terminated his mission,

"l~aving

the Uruguayan
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Government more convinced than ever that no friendly cooperation was possible with the subtly hqstile Government of

16

General Bartolome Mitre."

The Blancos were

essential~y

correct in their assess-

ment of the activities and attitude of the Argentine Government,. an assessment they
observers.

sha~ed_with

more disinterested

Four months after Flores had

the British-Charge at Buenos Aires

invaded Uruguay,

r~ported

to his Government

that "All dispassionate persons concur in the belief that
clandestine assistance has been afforded to Venancio Flores
by this Government·

while one of its· members· has taken little

pains to conceal his sympat&ies and hopes for the success of
the revolution."17
Britis~ Charg~

d'

The following month, on August 27, 1863,
Affaires Doria ~gain reported to. his
.

-

.

government on the revolution in Uruguay:
I am informed by a person .who is. in the
confidence of a member of this Government,
that the hope and intentiori:_has been enter- ·
tained by this Government since Flores
left Buenos Aires to annex the Republic of
Uruguay to the Confederation. The newspapers
now write ot i t and it is ~poken of openly.18

I

That Mitre was biased in his attitude towards the contending

I

factions in Uruguay there is

l
I
I
I

friend and Mitre was indebted to him ·for the services he· had
performed at Pavon.
mies in the

li~tle

doubt.

Flores was a close

Moreover, the Blancos were his old ene'

/

international party game of the Rio de la Plata.·

Flore's invasion was prepared and launched from Argentine
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soil under the noses of the authorities at Buenos Aires,
and Mitre-was rightfully suspected·of aiding his friend in

that invaaion.19
Following the termination of Lapido's mission at Buenos
Aires, and while Flore's i~vasion was still in the preparatory
stages, the Blanco's began looking around for allies to ward
off the threat presented their Government by

Flore's impen-

ding invasion and the covert hostility of the Argentine
Government.

The Blancos were also experiencing difficulties

in their relations with·

the Brazilian Government over the

alleged harassment visited upon that nation's citizens by
Uruguayan authorities.

They therefore turned to Paraguay

and played upon the suspicions of Argentine motives harbored
by the leader of that nation. ·

During March of 1863,

Lap~do

was given instructions for·
/

a new mission he was to undertake, this time at Asuncion.
He was to point out the similarity .of the political positions
of the two countries, both menaced by two unscrupulous neighbors.

The policies of Paraguay

and-~ruguay

should be·

"directed to the establishment of a balance· of· power • • •

The system

of a balance of power preserves peace because it

inspires the fear of war."20

If Paragu~y and Uruguay coopera-

ted,they might be able to play a considerable part in the
I

future of the Rio de la Plata. and perhaps some of the

~ro-

vinces of the Argentine Confederation would join them in_
establishing an equilibrium ·favorable to their continued
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sovereignty and ·the advancement· of

thei~

common interests:

·"The danger was common. and in common should be the efforts
made to meet it."21
/

Lapido arrived at Asuncion in early July of 1863, and
on the 18th of that month proposed to President Francisco
/

.

'

~olano

Lopez, who had ascended to that office following the

death

of his fat~er the previous yea~,

offensive and defensive alliance.

the formation of an

/

Lopez was

caut~ous,

however, and seemed to be waiting until events ·made clearer
the intentions of the Argentine Government.

Moreover, he

was also disturbed by reports that Uruguay was negotiating
I

an allian·ce with Brazil and simuft·aneously arra1nging with.
Urq~iza

for a pronunciamiento against Buenos Aires in
/

/

Entre Rios.

Lopez

w~s

r!gh~·fully

suspicious of the intrigues

of the Blanco politicians and their.attempts to draw his
nation into

th~

ing to weave.

Empire

wit~

complex web of relationships

the~

were attempt-

Moreover, he· wan.ted no truck with the Brazilian

whom Paraguay had.sustained a long and bitter dis-

pute over the northern boundiry ·be~ween the two nations and
the right of transit
\"

~long

those. portions of the international

waterways within Paraguayan· jurisdictio~.
I

.

.

Although Lopez was unwilling to commit his nation to an

\

\

I
\

alliance with the Uruguayan Blancos, there is little doubt
that be was apprehensive about the clandestine assistance
ilores was receiving from the Argentine Government and the
implications such ·action held for the welfare of his nation.
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/

As Warren says, "Lopez believed that the peace and liberty
of the Plata area were based on an.equilibrium of force
between Brazil and Argentina and the maintenance of that
\

equilibrium was the basic objective and the key
Paraguayan policy."22

,

~o

every

/

In.other words, Lopez predicated his

policy upon the maintenance of the existing balance of power;
Argentine actions were threatening that equilibrium, and .
Lopez responded by demanding explanations from that Power
of its activities with regard to the

Urug~ayan

revolution.

On September 6, 1863, L&pez·directed that a note be
sent th·e Argentine Government -requesting explanations of
the actions alleged to it in the confidential ·notes he. had
received from the Blanco Government.

In that note Para-

guayan Foreign Minister Jos~ Berge.s detailed the Blanca's
complaints ,to

his Goyernment, asked for explanations of

the alleged ·actions from the

Argent~n.e

Government, and

referred to .t~e "disastrous effects" thos.e· actions "may have
on the general interests· of the Republic of Paraguay~••23
/

,

Two months· later Lopez, not having received a satisfactory reply from the Argentine Government to his request
for.explanations, ·circulated a note ·

~o

the Diplomatic Cotps

at Asunci~n in· which.he warned· that Paraguay regarded the
independence of Uruguay as a requisite condition to the
I

}

/

"political balance of power of the States of the Rio ·de la
Plata, and that she would exert all her influence to end the
.serious situation tha~ had aris~n. 11 24
The correspondence between the two Governments continued

.

..... ,,.. ~
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throughout the year

/

~-with

.

.

Lopez reiterating his demands for

explanations. supporting those demands with documentary proof
of Argentine complicity in the Uruguayan revolution, and

Argentina evading the specific charges.
/

Lopez, exasperated by

On February 6, 1864,

:·

th~

failure of the Argentine Government

to give a detailed account of its policy in the Uruguayan
sit_uation, directed Berges to· _address a
Foreign Minister.

In his note,

not~

to the Argentine

the Paraguayan -Foreign

Minister warned that his Government, confronted as it was
~it~out

with the necessity of doing

the friendly explanations

it had requested of the Argentine Government, would "be guided

on

by its own appreciations

the significance of the events

that may compromise the sovereignty and independence of
Uruguay, to whose fate it
from-considerations of

~annot

remain indifferent both

national dignity and from tne point

..

/

of view of its own interests iri the Rio de la Plata~25

,

..

While Lopez was suspicious of Argentine motives in its
of~Uruguay,

relations with the Republic

he still.resisted

the request of· the Blancos for .an offensive and defensive
alliance.

He did, however, undertake measures to put his
.

nation on a war-footing:
by broadening the

of

w~r

.

he increased the size of his aTmy

conscription~

and he stepped up

p~rchases

materials from ·abroad.
Here matters rested

~

~or

deeply suspicious of Argentine

/

the time being with Lopez.
~otives,

per~eiving

that

nation's actions in the Uruguayan revolution as a direct
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threat to the well-being o~ Paraguay.· an~ m~bilizing his
~ation

for the eventuality

of a war with Argentina.

Then

the situation was revolutionized when the Brazilian Empire

was drawn into the Uruguayan imbroglio.
The Empire of Brazil initially

attempt~d

to remain

neutral in the affairs which were aff lictin~ the Uruguayan
Republic.·

disturbe~

Brazil,

by reports that Flores was

receiving covert aid from the Argentine

Governmentt sounded

that Government out with regard to the Mitre-Flores rela-

tionship, and was apparently satisfied w·ith the assurances
given it by Mitre that ·he harbored no ambitions in Uruguay
.that would adversely affect the interests of Brazil.

In

October, 1863, the Brazilian Minister at Montevideo was sent
on a special mission to Buen9s

~ires

.in reconciling Argentina and Uruguay.

to

~f

fer his good of fices

This effort met tem-

porary success with the signing of the Elizalde-Lamas Protocol
of October 20, 1863, between the·

t~o

governments; but was soon

undermined by the insistence of.the Blanco Government that
/

Francisco Solano Lopez serve as co-arbitrator with the

j.

.Emp~ror in its dispute with· M~tre.26
The fiasco of the Pr6tocol revealed to Rio de Janeiro

·that the Uruguayan appeal of June 15, 1863, requesting that
Brazil interpose herself and protect Uruguay against the

4esigns of Buenos Aires, was not sincere; that simultaneously
the Montevidean Government had initiated diplomatic overtures
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at Asuncibn with a Government whose relations with the Empire
verged·on·the·hostile.

The Blanca's wrecking of the·Protocol

offended Brazil.who had offered her good offices in the best
of faith, .and illustrated the duplicity of 'the Blanco Govern-

ment and what could be expected f~om them in the future.
Moreover, events unfolding in Uruguay, as well as domestic
political considerations, soon made it necessary for Brazil
to interject herself into the disturbed affairs of Uruguay.
The root of Brazil's problem was its southern Province
of Rio Grande do Sul which borders on Uruguay.
the cattle barons

of that Province-had been

For years

k~enly

int~r-

ested in the affairs of the .Uruguayan Republic," since many
of them owned land and grazed their herds across the

border.

The cattlemen had run afoul the Uruguayan authorities who ·
· were attempting to tax and' in other ways control the export
of cattle in the northern region of their

n~tion,

and armed

clashes between
cattlemen and
local authorities were not
.
.
uncommon.27

To this immedi.ate'economic consideration was

added the traditional enmity

be~ween

Portuguese Americans

and Spanish Americans:

The two nations were -the inheritors of the
historic hatreds of Spaniards and Portuguese-dead rivalries that had become traditions.and
fo~nd their indefinite perpetuati~n in the
realities of the economic struggles of the
moment.
The international ~endetta was reflect~d in a.long series of outrages that
form the main theme o·f the diplomatic
correspondence of Brazil and Uruguay for
years.28

I
I
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The list of atrocities committed by the citizens of both.
nations against the citizens of the other is too long to
detail.

Both parties were guilty of such acts, but over the

years the Rio Grandeneses came to believe that they were
the victims of the Government at Montevideo and continually
appealed to Rio de Janeiro for aid in

reaching a· settlement

of their demands for reparatio~s.
When Flores invaded Uruguay in April 1863, many Rio
Grandeneses openly sided with him, some going so far as to
join his gaucho army.

They also brought increasing pressure

upon Brazilian authorities at Rio de

Janeiro~

Iri the

winter

of 1863-64 the cattle barons dispatched a· spokesman to Rio,
General Felipe Netto, to convince the Government that their
claims were juat and deserved attention.

Netto was success-

ful in convincing the politicians of the Brazilian Liberal

Party to champion his cause.

This group was on the rise and

Netto's propaganda served as a casus belli
to _the predominant Conservatives:

.'~the

f~r

their challenge

Liberals • • • con-

fronted the little Conservative rump • • • _arid • • • were
ready for a grand

i
I

I

I
I

gesture·~

• • •

It was in this excitable

atmosphere that General Netto began his raging, tearing

propaganda for a final reckoni~g with Uruguay ... 29

.The

pressure the Liberals brought ~o bear~ combined with the
fear of the possible secession of Rio Grande do Sul, which
had a history of

sepa~atism,

was.too great for the govern-

ment to withstand.

! -.
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On April 20, 1864. the Brazilian
·Affairs, Zacharias de Vasconcellos,·

Ministe~

~ispatched

Saraiva as Envoy Extraordinary to Montevideo.

of Foreign
/

Jose Antonio
Saraiva's

arrival in Uruguay in early May of 1864 was synchronized
with the movement to Uruguayan waters of a powerful ImperI

ia~

squadron.

The Envoy's instructions were to reach a

peaceful settlement of the Brazilian claims if. possible,
but he'was empowered to use force if

th~t

were deemed

necessary.
Saraiva soon realized the gravity

ot

the situation

in the Banda Oriental and ihe f~ct that the internal. pacification of· Uruguay was a .necessary prerequisite if internat~onal

warfare was to be averted.

cooperat~d

During

June he

with the representatives of Argentina.

and

Britain in a joint representation desig·ned to pressure the
Blanco Government into reaching a settlem~nt with Flores.30
On June 23, 1864, a tentative agreement was reached between
Flores and the Blanco

Govetnm~nt

of Antanasio Aguirre who

1

had succeeded to the presid~n~~ the previous March.

The

agreement fashioned.by the Representatives of Brazil, Britain.

1.

I

and Argentina, also provided for an armistice.
The tentative

ag~eement

of late June 1863, which

appeared so promising as a means of resolving the internal
conflict in Uruguay and thus averting

th~

international

complications coincident to it, ran aground the shoals of
Blanco intransigence early the following month:

·L~~_,...

"Saraiva
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almost averted the catastrophe • • • ·but • • • was baffled
by the incredi~le obstinacy of the Blanco Government.u31

In essence, the peace negotiations had floundered because

of the unwillingness of an: extreme faction of the Blanco
Party, the "exaltees", to put the national interest of
Uruguay.above partisan consideration:

they threatened

President Aguirre with a coup d'etat if

he complied with

the terms of the peace proposal providing for the formation
of a new cabinet allowing the C~lorados some representation
in the Government of Uruguay.

As the internal situation

in Uruguay deteriorated an~. the. ci~il war was renewed,
international situation in

/

~the

Rio de la

Plat~

al~o

the

deter-

iorated as Brazil was drawn into intervention in Uruguay
and war with Paraguay.
Following the failure of.his diplomatic efforts to
.

.

.

resolve the internal strife in.Uruguay, Saraiva retired
-

to Buenos Aires.

Since pa~ific measures had· failed to

achieve his purposes, the next best option.open to the
Brazilian Envoy

was a

join~

Argentine-Brazilian inter-

vention against the Blanco Government which had refused the
terms of a just pacification.

This is what Saraiva proposed

to Mitre and his cabinet.on.July

13,

1863.

Mitre refused to accede to the proposal for joint
intervention in the Republic of Uruguay, fearing that such
an action would initiate civil strife in his own nation.

The pacification of Argentina was far from complete, and

..

~ -~'·
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such an action would provoke the Federalists to rise against

The Federalists

the Unitarian Government at Buenos Aires.
still identified

themselve~

had an £nherent distrust of

with the Blancos and, moreover,
·th~ ~razilian

intervention would be just ihe measure

Empire.

cal~ulated

A joint
to defeat

Mitre's efforts to integrate and pacify his own nation.

The Argentine President did agree, however, to allow the
·Brazilian Government to act ·unilaterally against the
Blancos .. 32
Having secured Argentine consent for unilateral
measures against the Uruguayan Government, and receiving
instructions from his own Govern·ment to return to
video and present an

ultimat~m

Saraiva recrossed the estuary
1864, Saraiva presented his·
Foreign Minister

I

Mont~-

to the.Government there,
ea~ly

famou~

in August.

On.August .4,

ultimatum. to Blanco

'

Jose Herrexa, granting six days to

J~an

comply and threatening

rep~isals.if

his

demands were not

met.
Even before Saraiva h~d presented his uitimatum to

the Uruguayan. Gove.rnment, the Blanco· Foreign Minister had
renewed his diplomatic

ove~tures

.

/

to· Asuncion.

Following

Argenti~e-~razilian-British

the breakdown of the

mediation

!.

effort earl~ in July, on the question of admitting Colora-

I

dos to the Blanco Cabinet, Herrera appealed
/

Lopez.

In fact,

the terms of

~hat

one~

more to

the refusal by the Blancos to accede to
mediation were largely conditioned by

.!

I:

_,,.,.. ~y

....

-

.t

-~· ..~
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the hopes they reposed in.the· aceive·assistance of Paraguay.
They did not want to share. p_ower with. the Colorados; this
~.

meant the continuation of the ci~il war in Uruguay with the

resulting international

If the Paraguayan

com~lications.

dictator made clear his determination to prevent intervention in Uruguay, perhaps ."i.t ·wouid grant them the time
necessary to destroy Flores ·:and· thus resolve the whol-e
problem.
/

Lopez

In other words, the Blancos were counting on

to pull their chestnuts from the fire:

Their enemies were entrenched at Buenos Aires,
and they profoundly distrusted Brazil.
If they
were going to face up to both their great neighbors, inevitably they must seek support in the
only.region where they could. find it. Thus
Berro 's 'national policy of .1 ndependence' was
.insensibly perverted into one of antagonism
to Brazil and Buenos Aires and alliance with
P~ragriay and the dissident parts ·of Argentina.
The Blanco politicians, in other words, were
still playing
the international party ·game.33
Herrera dispatched Dr. Antonio de las Carreras on a
/·

special mission to Asuncion in July of 1864.

There Carreras

played upon the deep suspicions:of both Brazil and Argentina

harbored by the Paraguayan

~dictator.

He pointed out reports

then current in the porte·no press about the desirability of

I.

.

.

reconstituting the old viceroyalty under the new·name of the
/

Uriited States of the Rio de la Plata.

He

~ent

on to assert

that the present cooperation of Brazil and Argentina proved
an intention to

p~rtition

Uruguay.

He noted that the danger

that overhung Uruguay also thre-atened Paraguay and· would

l·

continue to do so as long as Buenos Aires dominated the rest

' •,/' .. :<_..:-?b'J......'-

•}{

'·.~"".'"~!
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of the Argentine provinces.

The· only way to eliminate ·that

menace was to "secure the isolation. of the malevolent power
by the secession of the·re~aining Argentine provinces."34
that~Parag~ay

He therefore proposed

ally itself with his

,

.

.

nation and the Argentine Provinces of Entre Rios and
ac~ie~ing

Corrientes as a means of

their common defense
/

and

pr~moting

their common interests in the Rio de la Plata.

In essence, this was the Lapido mission of 1863 renewed;
only now it was airected against both Brazil and Argentina.
/

Carreras requested that Lopez notify both those powers that
he would take part in any conflict that migbt arise with
/

Uruguay, and that Lopez pledge his aid to Uruguay once the
foreseen attack took place.35
.

/

Francisco Solano Lopez did not require much prompting
to make him· concerned with

~he

~ourse

of developments in

Uruguay. : He had inheri·ted his :·fa.ther·'s. intense distrust of
both Argentine and Brazilian designs in La Plata.

This was

a consuming fear, one that caused him to worry for the
continued independence of his nation.

What one historian

bas labeled "Paraguayan Paranoia" was in large part responsible for Ltpez's reaction to the events unfolding in Uruguay.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION:

AND THEN CAME WAR

/

Lopez responded to Saraiva's ultimatum to the Blanco
Government by issuing one of his own twenty-six

day~

later.

/
' s note to the Brazilian Government, ' dated August 30,
Lopez

1864, illustrates his concern

that the.balance of power in

/

the Rio de la Plata was thteatened by the event• unfolding
/

in Uruguay and Lopez's conviction that the maintenance of
that equilibrium was
his own

nation.

essen~ial·to

the continued welfare of

Issued under ~he s~gnature of Paraguayan

Foreign Minister Jos~ Berge~, the note refers to the interest
of the Paraguayan Government in· the settlement of the dif ficul ties in Uruguay, "to the ·.fate of which state it cannot be
indifferent."

·Berges' note goes on to state that while

·appreciating the right of g~vernme~ts to arrange for the
satisfaction of their differences and reclamations, that
the Paraguayan Government mus_t ·.not "lose sight of its right
to appreciate the mode of effecting the satisfaction of the

claims of your Excellency's Gove.rnment, because the results
may influence the legitimat·e interests of Paraguay."

Berges'

note also includes a veiled threat that the President of
Paraguay:
i

• • • will consider as infr~nging on the ·
equilibrium of the States of the Plata any
occupation, by the Imperial forces,·of
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Montevidean territory 1 .·for. the motives
named in the ultimatum of the fourth.
instant • • • as that equilibrium.interests Paraguay as a guarantee of her
safety, peace and prosperity; and that
he protests in a most solemn.manner,
against such an act, r~lievi~g himself
of all responsibilitl as to the results
of this declaration.
.

/

The following day the· Brazilian Minister to· Asuncion,
Via·nna de Lima, replied to .Berges' no·te, asserting that
"no consideration shall detain the Imperial Government in

carrying out the sacred mi~si~n;;bic~~h~~~d~volyed upon it
of protecting the life,.honor, and property ·of the subjects
of Hi~ Excellency the Emper~r.••2

The true interests of Brazil

...

cautioned against its involvement in the Uruguayan

but

situation,

with the refusal of the Blanco Government to .meet Brazil-

ian demands, "national

hono~"

became an issue.

Furthermore,

because of the internal political situation in Brazil, the
.·Imperial Governm~nt could n~t afford ·to seem hesitant in
pushing the demands o f

its n·a ti on a 1 s , even if such a course

should involve Brazil in a war from which she stood to gain
little.

Later that month the

Bra~~lian

Foreign Office

approved Vianna de Lima's response to Berges' note.3

Thus, domestic politics

ai~-

the n•tional honor of Brazil

contributed to·a situation ·which made the resolution of the
original problem, short of war, impossible.

Similar co-n-

I

siderations motivated Francisco Solano Lopez in the course
he pursued.

Accoiding to Box, L~pez's actions did not hinge

solely upon his fears for the territorial integrity of his

I

.....

..

~

';!

....
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nation, but also on the fact that the course of events.~ight
I

block the development of his own policy in the
Plata:

"It was in a

word,_~

Rio de la

policy of adventure, as all

such claims to a 'place i~, the.~un,' and

a

right to make

one's voice heard and 'national dignity' must .always be."4
L6pez, says Kolinski, inter)ected himself in the dispute
.

·,

between Brazil and Uruguay.not

~nly

because he feared chan-

ges _in the existing equilibrium, but also because he was
"seeking greater prestige for himself and his nation in
La Plata affairs."5 ·
Brazil, secure in the knowledge that

Argen~ina

would

allow her a free hand in Uruguay, believing that the Blanco
Government would quickly succumb, and not suspecting that
/

i~no~cd

Lopez would dare challenge her.moves,
ultimatum and proceeded with

th~

invasion of Uruguay during

~

October of 1864.

the Paraguayan

Lopez, .upon hearing

-of the Brazilian

invasion, responded by sei~ing ~he MaTquiz de Olinda, on
November 12, 1_864, a Brazilian·steamer in Paraguayari waters
at the time.

The following· month Paraguayan forces invaded

the B.razilian Province of Mato <!rosso.

After successfully
/

completing the operations against·that Province, Lopez turned
eastward toward Brazil.

On February 6, 1865, he requested

permission to cross the Argentine Province of Corrientes so
·as to

wag~

war on Brazil.

Three days later

~itre

denied that

request, claiming he desired to remain neutral and could not
.allow the territory of the

t..•·

t; .
'JI.\'"

Arg~ntine.

Republic to be violated

:...'... ~·

..
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by permitting Paraguay to conduct men and materials of war
/
Lopez
interpreted Mitre's refusal as an admission

across it.

of an Argentine alliance with Brazil, and on April 13, 1865,
he invaded Corrientes, sim_ultaneously. declaring war on the
Argentine Confederation.

On May 1, 1865, Flores, who owed

his ascension to power in Uruguay to. Brazilian
ence in that

n~tion's

interfer-

civil war, signed the Treaty of the.

Triple Allianc~ with Argentine and.Brazil, dedicated to
/

the removal of Lopez as a threat to their security.

The

events of the long and sanguineous war that foliowed ~o
not concern

us although, needless to say, they were as

complex and confused as those

leadin~

to i t .

As the preceding narrative illustrates, extremely
complex forces were involved

i~

producing the

~ituation

which culminated in the outbreak of war in 1864.

In at-

tempting to determine the factors responsible for breeding
this situation, it seems obvioµs that protracted
disputes

boundary

played a large role in frustrating the relations

between the nations involved. and contributed to the suspicions and animosities which characterized those relations.
Paragu~y sustained long-enduri~~-•
l.

an~ oftenttmes bitter,

territorial disputes with both he!. large neighbors, and
these frequently led to strained relations and, occasionally,

to violent reprisals.

Moreover, in Paraguay's efforts

to safeguard her ter~itorial integr~ty, the tiny ~at~on
came to utilize the techniques of balance of power politics

·'.
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in the hope of thereby.achieving· a favorable resolution of
the territorial questions.
Closely tied to the question of boundaries were

significant economic motivations regarding the freedom of
nav~gation

Brazil.'s
l'-'

I

so as

and control of the Plate and its tributaries:

de~ire

to assure it• transit rights in the region

to be able to pursue her aspiration~ for the devel-

opment of the Empire's interior provinces; the desire of
landlocked Paraguay to assure egress for its commerce through
the Parana-Plata system; the desire of Buenos Aires to domina te and control

the region ·and its trade.

Furthermore,

both Argentine and Brazil hoped, somehow, to link the rich
pastoral economy of the Banda Oriental to their own economies.
Adding fuel to the fires
phenomenon of nationalism:

~reeding·

this war was the

~

Lopez' desire to gain respect

and, so to speak, "a place in the sun" ·for his nation; the
Blanco's intransigence before the demands made upon them by
the Empire of Brazil which was motivated by a combination of
political consider·a tions a·nd a· .desire to pro tee t

the nation-

al integrity of their country; Mitre's' unwillingness to
compromise Argentina's

integr~ty by p~rmitting L6pez

to

cross through· th~t nation's- te~~itory.cn his way to .the
"/

theater of war, an action which provoked Lopez and thus

dre~

the Argentines into the fray; and Brazil's.concern with the
honor and integrity of both the nation and its citizens, a
concern which led her to make demands upon the Uruguayan
.

I

nation and provoke war in the Rio· de la Plata.
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)

. Transcending these factors and.interacting with them
was the existence of a balar<Lce of po_wer system in the La
Plata Basin.

All four nations were vitally concerned with

the maintenance of their sovereignty and the advancement
of their national interests, and displayed a willingness

I

to utilize the techniques of balance of power politics to.

The conflicting goals of Brazil

achieve th•ir objectives.

and Argentina, both attempting t~ extend

their control over

the river system and contiguous areas, conspired to keep
international relations in the area

stirre~

up.

The leseer

powers, Uruguay and Paraguay, .were vitally concerned with
their positions in this "historic tug-of-war" between their
/

two large neighbors--as witnessed by Lopez' note of August

30, 1864, in which he exp_ressed

his concern over the "eq ui/

librium'' of the states of the Rio de la Plata.
trative of the functionings of the

were the

Blan~o's

balance of power

efforts to find allies to offset the
threatenin~

menace of an increasingly
Despite

Pla~ine

Also illus-

Brazil.

its tragic ccinsequences, there was an element

of irony surrounding the origins of the Paraguayan War.

That irony lies in the fact
Solano

~6pez'

tha~,

notwithstanding Francisco

proclamations expressing his concern with the

/.

maintenance of the Platine balance of power, it was his
aggressive pursuit

of that object which provoked the war.
/

The decision by Carlos Antonio Lopez to break with Paraguay's
traditional policy of isolation had shaken the

.(

.

~quilibrium

of
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Platine system's power

structu~e by

interjecting a new

element~

As one historian has noted in this resp·ect, "The interference
of landlocked Paraguay in Platine affairs radica11y affected

the

region's power politics. 0 6

,

. Lopez' policy prepared the way for Paraguay being drawn
into the morass of Platine politics.
iences in the

His subsequent exper-

int~rnational~re~ations

/

of the Rio de.la Plata

only deepened his already ireat suspicions of Brazil and
Argentina and caused him to
nation of Paraguay.

militarizing the tiny

begi~

But it was his son who completed the
/

.

.

process of militarization •. The second Lopez was "convinced
that Paraguay's best defense lay in an offensive capacity
which would comma~d respect."7 and ensure the nation's welfare in ·case of future complications with her large netghbors.
Ori the ·eve of the war, Paraguay had the largest stand.i

ing, and probably best equipped9 army in South America.
one historian has pointed out,

~for

As

a brief· period a ppterrtial

Prussia had appeared in S~ut~ Am~ri~a."8

That· Paraguay ul-

timately lost the war is understandable--the potential man.power and resources of the allied nations. in a protracted
war such as the Paraguayan War were just too great for
Paraguay to overcome.

Nonetheless, the long duration of

that conf1ict illustrates the

c~aracter

of the war machine

.

/

Lopez had

fashioned out of his t1ny nation; and that such

a power was a threat to the equilibrium and security of the
nations of
correct

.

/

the Rio de la Plata.

The allies

wer~

essentially

in their estimation of the mutu41 danger that was

-.

,,,."";··' •l. ;...,
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presented by a strong and

aggres~ive

Paraguay.

In the

phraseology of the Treaty of the Trip~e Alliance, "the
peace,

safety, and.well being of their respective nations

is impossible while the

presen~

Government of

Pa~~~uay

exists."9
But then again, the allies were not innocents, and
/

Lopez' actions were

larg~ly

a response to, and conditioned

upon, the suspicions he harbored of Brazilian and Argentine
/

designs in the Rio de la Plata.

In turn, those. suspicions,

as well as the designs themselves, extended~~ack miny g~ner-.
ations and were a product of the historical development of
/'

the Rio de la Plata.
evo~ution

Another part of that process was the

of a Platine balance of ·power system.

of that system, and the intrigues,

sus~icions,

The workings
and artimosi-

·ties it spawned,· created an atmosphere· conducive to war.
It. also pro.d.uced an outlook among the lead.era of these
nations which.viewed warfare·as a legitimate means of securing a favorable balance of power and thereby advancing the·
"national interests" of their respective countries.

;'{."';.
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